Touro Law Review
Volume 29
Number 4 Annual New York State Constitutional
Issue

Article 11

March 2014

The Blueprint: Critiques of the Fingerprint and Abandonment
Paradigms Utilized to Reject an Expectation of Privacy in DNA
Avi Goldstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Goldstein, Avi (2014) "The Blueprint: Critiques of the Fingerprint and Abandonment Paradigms Utilized to
Reject an Expectation of Privacy in DNA," Touro Law Review: Vol. 29: No. 4, Article 11.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

The Blueprint: Critiques of the Fingerprint and Abandonment Paradigms Utilized
to Reject an Expectation of Privacy in DNA
Cover Page Footnote
29-4

This article is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/11

Goldstein: The Blueprint

THE BLUEPRINT: CRITIQUES OF THE FINGERPRINT AND
ABANDONMENT PARADIGMS UTILIZED TO REJECT AN
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN DNA
CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK CITY
People v. Vernon B.1
(decided June 15, 2012)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The defendant, Vernon B., was charged with one count of
criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.2 On November
10, 2011, a police officer allegedly observed the defendant throwing
a bag from the window of a residence, and upon inspection, he found
the bag contained a loaded 9mm pistol, which subsequently tested
positive for male DNA.3 On April 27, 2012, the People filed a motion under Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) section 240.40 to compel the defendant to submit to an oral swab for DNA testing. 4 The
defendant opposed the motion on both Fourth Amendment and procedural grounds.5
The United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of
Appeals have both determined that a search into a person’s body war1

35 Misc. 3d 1241(A) (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 1.
3
Id.
4
Id. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 240.40(2)(b)(v) (McKinney 2009):
Upon motion of the prosecutor, and subject to constitutional limitation the
court . . . may order the defendant to provide non-testimonial evidence.
Such order may . . . require the defendant to . . . [p]ermit the taking of
samples of blood, hair or other materials from his body in a manner not
involving an unreasonable intrusion thereof or a risk of serious physical
injury thereto.
5
The defendant argued that the People’s motion was submitted late without good cause,
and that the People did not establish the required elements of the constitutional standard set
by the New York Court of Appeals for a valid search for bodily evidence. Vernon B., 35
Misc. 3d 1241(a) at 1 (citing to In re Abe. A., 437 N.E.2d 265, 266 (N.Y. 1982)).
2
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rants the protection of the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be
conducted reasonably.6 A determination of reasonableness is correlative: greater intrusions require the highest degree of suspicion probable cause, which is the belief that it more likely than not evidence is
located in a specific place.7 Lesser intrusions, however, require a
mere reasonable, articulated suspicion about the presence of evidence.8
The degree of intrusion associated with a DNA search has
never been explicitly ruled on by the United States Supreme Court or
the New York Court of Appeals, likely because of the unique nature
of DNA. DNA is a molecule that is present in almost every cell of
the body, and it contains an individual’s entire genetic structure, a sequence comprised of three million unique identifiers that, when compared to a separate molecule of DNA, creates an almost certain possibility of matching the samples and their donors.9 Because of this
accuracy, DNA evidence is highly sought after to aid prosecutors in
obtaining convictions with increasing frequency.10
The broad power of DNA evidence must be tempered by the
protections of probable cause and not any lower standard. This assertion is justified not only by precedent, but also by scientific developments and common sense concerns affecting DNA evidence. For example, some commentators have suggested that DNA evidence is not
the infallible gold standard it is generally presumed to be. 11 Despite
possible concerns about DNA, the variety of ways that prosecuting
authorities can use DNA samples to help marshal evidence is increasing.12 Therefore, it is a troubling prospect to consider the ever grow6

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966); Abe A., 437 N.E.2d at 266.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
8
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
9
People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1994).
10
See 35 J.L MED & ETHICS 310 (2007) (finding that as of 2001, 68% of prosecutors reported using DNA evidence at least once in a felony case).
11
See Kimberly A. Polanco, Constitutional Law- the Fourth Amendment Challenge to
DNA Sampling of Arrestees Pursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK. L. REV. 483, 525 (2005) (questioning the reliability of DNA sample analysis quality
assurance procedures).
12
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1435 a(a)(1), (c)(1) (2012) (establishing a federal database of DNA
samples from convicted offenders, and compiling state samples into a national database);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c (McKinney 2012) (establishing a state database of DNA samples
seized from convicted offenders). Some states and the federal government now conduct seizures, and store DNA samples from arrestees, and then compare these samples to evidence
from both unsolved and future crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387,
405 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that suspicionless collection of DNA samples from arrestees
7
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ing intrusions created by DNA seizures and the use of DNA evidence
at trial. Recent scientific developments proving that crime scene
DNA evidence can be fabricated quite easily, as well as other scientific and legal concerns, such as the reliability of analysis and potential for disclosure of private medical information, demonstrate the intrusion of a seizure has grown and may never stop doing so.13 These
considerations undoubtedly call for a requirement that obtaining
DNA samples through any means constitutes a search requiring probable cause.
This case note will discuss a jurisdictional split regarding the
degree of intrusion created by a DNA seizure. First, this note will
present the case law associated with the protective majority approach,
which analyzes DNA seizures as full intrusions requiring probable
cause.14 Next, the minority approach will be discussed, which based
on flawed assertions, interprets the intrusion created by DNA seizures
as uninvasive.15 Under the minority approach little or no government
justification is required for a DNA seizure. The minority reaches this
result by equating DNA with abandoned material or by characterizing
it as merely a genetic fingerprint; however, this comparison is inherently unsound.16 Last, it will be demonstrated that the minority approach is inconsistent with federal precedent and its characterization
of DNA rests on flawed interpretations of scientific facts. Correct interpretations of the related law, associated science, and the incorporation of recent developments will demonstrate that DNA seizures are
highly intrusive, and therefore must be protected fully by probable
cause.
II.

THE OPINION: PEOPLE V. VERNON B.
A.

Facts

On November 10, 2011, a police officer allegedly observed
does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
13
See infra Part IV.
14
See United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D.N.Y 1995) (using probable
cause as the standard for determining the appropriateness of a DNA seizure).
15
United States v. Owens, No. 06-CR-72A, 2006 WL 3725547, at *1, *6 (W.D.N.Y Dec.
15, 2006).
16
Id.
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the defendant, Vernon B., throwing a bag from the window of a residence.17 Upon searching the bag, the officer recovered a 9mm pistol
loaded with one round of ammunition, and the defendant was subsequently charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth
degree.18 The recovered pistol tested positive for the presence of
male DNA.19 On April 27, 2012, the People sought an order compelling the defendant to provide an oral swab to determine if his DNA
was a match to the sample found on the pistol.20 The defendant opposed the motion asserting, inter alia, that the stringent standards set
for issuing an order to obtain forensic evidence from a defendant
were not met.21
B.

The Holding

The standard for issuing a constitutionally valid order to obtain physical forensic evidence, set by the Court of Appeals in Matter
of Abe A.,22 requires the prosecution to establish three elements.23
The first element is probable cause, which requires essentially a
demonstration it is more likely than not that the defendant committed
the crime.24 The second element is a clear indication that relevant
material evidence will be found, and the third element is that the
method used to secure the evidence is safe and reliable.25 These elements are based on the bodily search standard first set by the United
States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California,26 and they have
been used to govern the constitutionality of DNA searches in New
York State trial courts.27
17

Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 1.
Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(1) (providing that “[a] person shall be guilty of
criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when (1) he or she possesses any firearm”)).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. Defendant also argued that the motion was not submitted within the time period
prescribed by statute; however, the governing statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 240.90 (McKinney 2009), permits the late submission of a discovery motion on good cause, and the Court
permitted the prosecution to submit the motion because of the date on which it received the
lab reports for the case. Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 1.
22
437 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1982).
23
Id. at 266.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 270.
26
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
27
Abe A., 437 N.E.2d at 270 (citing to Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). As will be discussed,
18
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The court in Vernon B. dismissed the defendant’s contentions
regarding the reasonableness and the likelihood of success regarding
the proposed search.28 However, the court held that it may be likely
the People had not established probable cause that the defendant
committed the crime.29 The court also expressed reservations about
whether the police officer had probable cause to search the bag
thrown from the window.30 Because the bag and gun provided the
only reason to believe the defendant committed the crime, if these
items were illegally seized, then they must be suppressed and the
prosecution must be terminated.31 The court found that the possibility of illegal seizure was very real, and therefore did not issue a ruling
on the DNA order because of the possibility that the prosecution
would be terminated.32
C.

The Court’s Reasoning

The determination of whether probable cause exists is essential because a request for non-testimonial evidence like the DNA order sought in Vernon B. is akin to a search warrant.33 A motion to
compel a bodily intrusion, either through a discovery order or search
warrant, is essentially a judicial determination that probable cause exists, and this determination must be supported on legally obtained ev-

the removal of DNA must be protected by full probable cause as is done in New York State
courts. See, e.g., People v. Afrika, 914 N.Y.S. 2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2010) (relying on the Abe A. standard to govern the intrusiveness of a DNA search). However, some
courts and commentators have argued that DNA searches should be subject to lesser standards of protection as DNA searches involve little to no intrusion on personal interests. See
infra Parts IV, V. The court in Abe A. went so far as to suggest that any lesser protections
for bodily searches are not “constitutionally firm.” Abe A., 265 N.E.2d at 269.
28
Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2 (“[T]he only viable challenge that the defense raises to an
oral swab order under Abe A. is that there is no probable cause because the evidence in this
case was allegedly seized unlawfully.”).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. (“[I]f the bag, pistol and ammunition had been illegally seized they will be suppressed, and there would be no probable cause, thus resolving the DNA testing issue and, not
incidentally, terminating the prosecution.”).
32
Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2 (“Holding the suppression hearing at this point will therefore perhaps prevent an unnecessary physical intrusion into defendant and the delay that
DNA testing will cause, while at the same time advancing this case towards a resolution.”).
33
See Abe A., 437 N.E.2d at 266 (setting the standard for the constitutional limitations on
a search of a defendant’s body).
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idence only.34 Therefore, an order to search a defendant’s body,
founded upon probable cause, is “properly issued [when] the application contain[s] sufficient lawfully obtained information, untainted by
and independent of alleged illegally obtained evidence” to support
the determination.35 Warrantless searches are typically presumed unreasonable and impermissible, unless exigent circumstances necessitate the action and overcome this presumption.36
While the court in Vernon B. did not decide the issue of probable cause, the court discussed several cases with similar facts that
informed its ultimate conclusion that suspension of the proceedings
was necessary until this determination was made.37 In the first group
of cases, the officer’s presence on the property was equivalent to a
trespass because it was not supported by a warrant and no exigent
circumstances existed.38 Because of the possible trespass and lack of
emergency, the court questioned whether the officer was able to enter
the defendant’s property constitutionally, simply because he saw a
bag thrown from a window.39 Even if the officer was permitted to
enter the property, a second search was conducted when the defendant’s bag was opened and the gun was seized.40 While the bag itself
was in plain view and subject to seizure, the search into the defendant’s bag constituted a search of a closed container, which is typically
impermissible unless the arrestee can reach its contents.41 The arrestee in Vernon B. undoubtedly could not reach the bag to seize its
34

Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 1 (citing People v. Harris, 465 N.E.2d 36 (N.Y. 1984)). This
rule applies only if the evidence is obtained as the fruit of an unreasonable search or seizure.
See generally WAYNE. R. LAFAVE, ET AL., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1 -1.3 (4th ed. 2004).
35
Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 1-2 (citing People v. King, 663 N.Y.S. 2d 610, 613 (App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 1997)).
36
See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) (holding that searches or seizures
inside the home are presumptively unreasonable and that the government must prove the
presence of exigent circumstances to overcome this presumption).
37
Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2 (holding unclear).
38
Id. at 2. The court cited to United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), and People v.
Abruzzi, 385 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1976), to support this conclusion. Id. In
Jones, the court held that trespassing with an attempt to find something constituted a search
by police. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951. In Abruzzi, the court held that looking into private property and then entering constituted a search warranting Fourth Amendment protection.
Abruzzi, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
39
Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2.
40
Id. at 2.
41
Id. (citing People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the plain view
doctrine permitting warrantless seizures of evidence did not apply because the defendant
could not reach the container, and because the contents could have been secured until a warrant was issued)).
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contents because it had been thrown from a window, creating the
possibility that the gun’s seizure was unconstitutional.42 As the entry
into the property and the subsequent seizure of the defendant’s bag
and gun provided the only evidence to believe the defendant committed the crime, if found to be seized unlawfully they would be suppressed and the prosecution would be terminated.43 A careful examination of the facts and a hesitancy to conduct DNA searches absent
probable cause, as was done in Vernon B., are important because the
interest in one’s body is one of the most closely guarded areas in all
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.44
III.

FEDERAL PRECEDENT DICTATES THAT DNA SAMPLES ARE
PROTECTED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

DNA research is just coming out if its infancy in relation to
the law.45 This is understandable considering that the human genome
was not sequenced until 1953,46 and DNA evidence use did not become generally accepted in New York until the 1990s.47 Therefore, a
discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s bodily intrusion precedent, as
it applies to DNA, requires explanation through other types of seizures from the body.48

42

Id.
Vernon B., 35 Misc. 3d at 2 (“Accordingly, if the bag, pistol and ammunition had been
illegally seized, they will be suppressed, and there would be no probable cause . . . incidentally, terminating this prosecution.”).
44
“The importance of informed, detached, and deliberate determinations of the issue
whether or not to invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and
great.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
45
DNA was not used in criminal investigations until the mid 1980s, and since that time
numerous technological advancements have occurred. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third
Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009).
46
James Watson and Francis Crick first published their famous determination of the double-helix structure of DNA in 1953. James D. Watson & Francis H.C. Crick, A Structure for
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737-38 (1953).
47
See Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (holding that DNA evidence is generally accepted and reliable among the scientific community, and passes the Frye test).
48
See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (discussing bodily intrusion searches of the blood);
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (discussing bodily intrusions searches for evidence
under the nails); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(discussing bodily intrusion searches of urine and deep-lung breath); Nicholas v. Goord, 430
F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005) (using the above mentioned cases to determine whether the seizure
of DNA constitutes a search).
43
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Setting the Standard for a Heightened Bodily
Interest

The United States Supreme Court addressed the field of law
now governing DNA samples for the first time in 1966 when it decided Schmerber v. California.49 In Schmerber, the defendant was
receiving medical treatment in a local hospital for injuries suffered
while driving when the police arrested him and directed physicians to
take blood samples.50 The samples were later tested and found to
contain blood alcohol levels above the legal limit.51 Based on this evidence the court convicted the defendant of driving while intoxicated.52 The Court affirmed the state court’s conviction53 and held that
taking the blood samples and introducing them at trial did not violate
any of the defendant’s constitutional rights.54
The Court in Schmerber reasoned that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is not to prevent searches, but to protect people
against intrusions made in an unreasonable manner.55 Therefore, because the protection of “human dignity” is an extension of the Fourth
Amendment, any attempt to gather evidence that protrudes “beyond
the surface of the body” constitutes a search garnering the full protection of the Constitution, and a reasonableness evaluation must be
conducted.56 To determine the reasonableness of a search under the
Fourth Amendment, the nature and depth of an intrusion on the individual’s privacy interests must be balanced against the legitimate
governmental interests that intrusion promotes.57 Because the individual interest in personal dignity is so important in the Court’s view,
the balance of reasonableness test requires that the seizure of the per-

49

Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757.
Id. at 758.
51
Id. at 758-59.
52
Id. at 759.
53
Id.
54
See generally Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768 (holding that the seizure of physiological evidence from the defendant’s body did not violate the privilege against self incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment, that the search into the body was permitted by the Fourth
Amendment, and that the defendant’s Due Process rights and Sixth Amendment right to
counsel were not violated).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 769-70.
57
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (holding that “the permissibility of a
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”).
50
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son be conducted on probable cause58 and that authorities demonstrate a clear indication that relevant evidence will be found.59 Additionally, the methods used to obtain the evidence must be reasonable
in both the extent of the intrusion created by a particular procedure on
the individual’s interests in privacy and bodily integrity, and in the
specific way that the procedure threatens the individual’s safety or
health.60
Applying this test, the Court in Schmerber found that the officer’s suspicions about the defendant’s intoxication, such as his
glassy, bloodshot eyes and “similar symptoms of drunkenness,” were
highly relevant.61 These symptoms of intoxication justified not only
his arrest but also presented a clear indication that his blood would
contain evidence of intoxication.62 Likewise, the Court held that
blood tests in general were reasonable in terms of the defendant’s interests in privacy and bodily integrity because they are a commonplace and minimally invasive procedure.63 In addition, the blood test
did not unreasonably endanger the defendant’s health or safety because it was conducted in a medically appropriate manner.64 The
holding in Schmerber is important in the DNA search context because it established a heightened privacy interest over the body and
fashioned a unique test of review for bodily searches.65 However, it
is also important because blood tests, a common and accurate method
of obtaining DNA samples, were, as a practice, specifically held to
constitute a reasonable means of conducting a search.66
58

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
Id. at 769-70 (“The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained . . . [thus requiring] a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found.”).
60
Id. at 770-71 (noting that “the test chosen was a reasonable one” with regard to the bodily integrity concerns, specifically when performed with regard to the safety concerns). See
also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that conducting surgery to remove a bullet was unreasonable in light of the need for general anesthesia, which affected the safety
concerns and the need for exploratory probing to locate the bullet, which affected bodily integrity concerns, when weighed against the government’s interest and vast array of alternative evidence).
61
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at at 769.
62
Id. at 770 (“[T]he facts which established probable cause . . . also suggested the required relevance and likely success of a test of petitioner’s blood for alcohol.”).
63
Id. at 771.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 767-68.
66
See Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 440 (discussing the long standing use and value of blood
tests as a means of establishing DNA, for purposes of establishing paternity, and holding that
59
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Minimally Invasive Intrusions Still Constitute
Searches

The Schmerber test of reasonableness requires an analysis of
the effects and intrusiveness of a search on an individual’s health and
safety.67 Schmerber, however, only discussed blood tests.68 DNA
samples can be obtained in several other ways, such as through
buccal swabs or hair samples.69 These methods are much less physically invasive than a blood test.70 Because of their less invasive nature, the question of what degree of constitutional protection applies
to these less invasive procedures, if any, remains in debate.71 However, there is additional Supreme Court precedent, most notably Cupp
v. Murphy,72 that has been relied on to suggest that less invasive
DNA seizure techniques are still protected by the Fourth Amendment.73
In Cupp, the Court addressed the constitutionality of minimally invasive bodily search procedures. The defendant was convicted
of murdering his wife;74 the victim was strangled to death in her
home, and numerous lacerations and abrasions were found on her
throat.75 The presence of these lacerations implied that the attacker
would undoubtedly have evidence of the victim’s blood under his
the use of blood samples for establishing a person’s genetic identity was acceptable as evidence in criminal prosecutions).
67
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
68
Id. at 771-72 (excluding minimally invasive searches into the body conducted outside a
medical facility from this holding, but suggesting they would constitute searches, and require
the same careful analysis).
69
A buccal swab requires that a cotton swab be placed into a person’s mouth, and then
run along his or her cheek, and a hair sample requires that only a few hairs be plucked from
the scalp. Polanco, supra note 11, at 502-03.
70
Unlike the buccal swab or hair sample procedure, a blood test requires that a needle
physically pierce the skin. Id. at 501.
71
Compare Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55 (holding that the seizure of saliva for the purposes of examining a defendant’s DNA constituted the definition of a search under Schmerber,
as it was literally inside the body), with Owens, 2006 WL 3725547, at *6 (reasoning that because DNA can be voluntarily separated, for example through expectorating, it is more akin
to a characteristic constantly exposed to the public, and there is no Fourth Amendment protection for these characteristics, as is there is no expectation of privacy over what one knowingly exposes to the public).
72
412 U.S. 291 (1973).
73
See, e.g., Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp at 52 (discussing the relevance of Cupp, 412 U.S. 291,
and Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, to minimally intrusive DNA seizures).
74
Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292.
75
Id.
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fingernails from scratching her during the struggle.76 Officers
promptly called the defendant in for questioning and noticed a dark
spot, resembling blood, on his finger.77 Officers asked permission to
scrape for samples under his fingernails, but the defendant refused
and attempted to hide his hands.78 The defendant then began to
scrape under the nails himself with a key from his pocket, and it was
then that officers proceeded to take the samples over his protest.79
The Court held that this seizure, however minimal, implicated
the Fourth Amendment and the Schmerber balancing test because it
affected the defendant’s “personal security.”80 Applying this test, the
Court found that the officers undoubtedly had probable cause to suspect the defendant had committed the crime because of the way he
hid his hands.81 This action, when combined with the lacerations on
the victim’s neck, presented the clear indication required to believe
relevant evidence would be found.82 The Court was also satisfied
that the procedure was conducted reasonably because the intrusion
required to scrape material from under a nail was limited and did not
deeply affect the defendant’s privacy interests or his health and safety.83 This holding is highly informative for the DNA context because
a variety of DNA seizure methods, such as buccal swabbing84 or hair
sampling85 entail minimal invasions on the body but under Cupp’s
broad and protective holding they can still trigger constitutional scru76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296.
80
Id. at 294.
81
Id. at 296.
82
Id. at 295.
83
Id. at 296.
84
“Swabbing the inside of someone’s mouth with a soft pad to collect saliva or skin cells
is an effective way to collect DNA.” Polanco, supra note 11, at 526.
85
While hair is analogized to fingerprints, and exempted from the protections of the
Fourth Amendment as was done in In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1982), the degree of intrusion of the subsequent analysis of DNA taken from the hair should bring this
search within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (finding
a privacy interest in private medical facts revealed during the analysis of bodily material).
Hair sampling should also be considered a search because while hair may be constantly exposed to the public, the root is within the body, fitting the Schmerber definition, and the hair
must be scientifically analyzed for any evidentiary use which distinguishes it from fingerprints. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 N.W. U. L. REV. 857, 868 (2006) (arguing that constantly exposed
characteristic theories of the Fourth Amendment, like those advanced in Rosahn, should not
include genetic privacy concerns).
77
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C.

Genetic Privacy Interests Make DNA a Search

An analysis of the effect of an intrusion on individual interests
in privacy and bodily integrity is also required as part of the
Schmerber balancing test.87 Genetic privacy is one example of a serious concern affecting these individual interests.88 Nevertheless,
DNA is frequently mischaracterized and considered to be just a
means of identification not affecting this interest.89 However, DNA
includes private medical facts, and the Court addressed concerns
about the protection afforded to medical privacy in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association.90 In Skinner, the Federal Railroad
Administration (“FRA”) enacted a program that enabled supervisors
to take breath, blood, and urine samples from any railroad employee
involved in an accident.91 The Court ultimately concluded that this
practice did not violate the Fourth Amendment,92 but undoubtedly involved a search.93
The Court in Skinner reasoned that such practices were so intrusive on personal liberty and bodily integrity94 that they deserved
Fourth Amendment protection because they constituted physical
86
See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (extending Cupp and Schmerber to include non-surgical intrusions that invade on personal security); see also Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55 (holding that
minimal intrusions for DNA implicate the Fourth Amendment) (citing Cupp, 412 U.S. at
295).
87
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
88
DNA samples undoubtedly contain an enormous amount of information that a person
would have an interest is keeping private. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55.
89
See, e.g., Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 670 (classifying DNA use as a means of identification
only). But see DNA Forensics, Oak Ridge National Lab, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/
Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml#4 (last visited June 4, 2013) (discussing how a genetic
blueprint, like DNA, can only provide limited additional information to identity at this time,
but the science is expanding, and some of the material available now, is something which
individuals could expect to keep private, such as susceptibility to disease). DNA samples
also provide an opportunity for nefarious uses, that other means of identification do not.
Andrew Pollack, DNA Evidence Can Be Fabricated, Scientists Show, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2009.
90
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
91
Id. at 604.
92
Id. at 634.
93
Id. at 617 (“These intrusions [for blood, urine, and breath samples] must be deemed
searches under the Fourth Amendment.”).
94
Id. (“The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests.”).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/11

12

Goldstein: The Blueprint

2013]

THE BLUEPRINT

1163

searches of a person’s body95 and therefore had to be protected by the
amendment’s reasonableness standard. The interest in bodily integrity was implicated because the FRA’s procedures would reveal a host
of medical facts about the employee that he or she would undoubtedly want to keep private.96 The protection of private medical facts,
even without serious physical intrusion such as surgery, is what, by
extension to the DNA context, makes Skinner so relevant.97 The
Eastern District of New York and some commentators even consider
Skinner to be dispositive on the issue of whether DNA constitutes a
search.98 Many DNA seizures today focus on attempts to seize only
identity information in an effort to skirt the protections created by
Skinner to protect private medical information,99 but the door must
remain open to considerations of whether any private medical facts or
undiscovered scientific considerations will affect the reasonableness
of the intrusion created by a DNA seizure.100

95

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
Id. at 617 (“[C]hemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private
medical facts . . . .”). The invasion on the privacy associated with the act of urinating also
weighed in on the Court’s decision to consider these practices searches. Id.
97
“[E]ven the smallest penetration of the body will yield the entirety of a person’s genetic
information.” Joh, supra note 85. This genetic information can reveal “insights into many
intimate aspects of people . . . including susceptibility to particular diseases, legitimacy of
birth, and perhaps predispositions to certain behaviors and sexual orientation.” DNA Forensics, supra note 89. The disclosure of these facts undoubtedly implicates the private facts
discussed in Skinner.
98
See Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 54 (holding the privacy interest found in Skinner is an essential component of why DNA must be considered a fully intrusive search); see Polanco,
supra note 11, at 507 (“Skinner stands for the proposition that an analysis of biological material that reveals no private information would not qualify as a search for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.”); See Joh, supra note 85, at 872 (reasoning that Skinner’s holding that
subsequent analysis of the sample constitutes a search, applies to DNA).
99
See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(3)(a) (“[A] sample appropriate for DNA testing to
determine identification characteristics . . . .”).
100
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 669 (“The junk DNA that is extracted has, at present, no known
function, except to accurately and uniquely establish identity. Although science may someday be able to unearth much more information about us through our junk DNA.”). This junk
DNA, however, provides additional personal information such as susceptibility to disease.
See DNA Forensics, supra note 89. Today, junk DNA can undoubtedly be used to fabricate
evidence, indicating the time has arrived for even identity DNA to be subject to full protections. See Pollack, supra note 89.
96
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THE MINORITY VIEW: DNA SEARCHES WARRANT LITTLE
OR NO FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION

If the individual interest in privacy is lessened, or the procedures of the search entail a lesser intrusion, the government would be
permitted to conduct that search under a less protective standard than
probable cause.101 These lower protections are warranted because citizens would essentially be deemed to have less fear of the “random or
arbitrary acts of the government.”102 Even in these situations, courts
have still required a reasonable, articulated suspicion about the value
of the search.103 Relying on this lower standard, the Western District
of New York and some commentators have argued that the individual
privacy interest maintained over DNA is so decreased that the full
protections of the Fourth Amendment may not be entirely necessary,
or that Fourth Amendment protection may not be necessary at all.104
A.

Why We Do Not “Abandon” Our DNA

The abandonment theory is one view advanced in support of
lower standards for the seizure of DNA evidence. This view, enunciated in United States v. Owens,105 asserts that humans essentially discard their DNA so frequently through various means such as coughing, chewing gum, or even licking a stamp, that there is a very limited
expectation of privacy over it.106 In Owens, the defendant, while fleeing the scene after robbing a bank, abandoned a sweatshirt which had
male DNA on it.107 Fingerprints obtained from the bank matched a
sample of the defendant’s fingerprints maintained in a national database, and relying on this match the prosecution sought an order com101

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (“When the balance of interests precludes insistence on a
showing of probable cause, we have usually required ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’ before concluding that a search is reasonable.”) (quoting United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
102
Id. at 622.
103
Id. at 624.
104
See, e.g., Owens, 2006 WL 3725547 (discussing the applicability of reasonable suspicion, and advancing a lowering of the DNA privacy interest on an abandonment theory); see
also Justin A. Alfano, Look What Katz Leaves Out: Why DNA Challenges The Scope Of The
Fourth Amendment, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017 (2005) (arguing a lowering of the DNA privacy interest on the theory the physical and privacy intrusions associated with DNA are minimal, if not nonexistent).
105
Owens, 2006 WL 3725547.
106
Id. at *6.
107
Id. at *3.
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pelling the defendant to provide a saliva swab to be examined for the
purposes of matching his DNA to the abandoned sweatshirt.108
The court in Owens held that instead of probable cause, a reasonable suspicion about the probative value of a DNA seizure is the
required standard the prosecution must meet in order to compel a defendant to submit a buccal swab.109 In doing so, the court distinguished several seemingly dispositive cases as well.110 The court
conceded that the principle created in Skinner, namely that a practice
of gathering evidence does not need to involve a surgical intrusion to
constitute a search when the search reveals private medical facts, applied to DNA.111
However, the court distinguished DNA from the evidence
searched in Skinner by examining the way humans interact with their
DNA.112 The court reasoned that DNA molecules in a variety of the
internal fluids in which humans carry them are “readily and involuntarily separated from the human body.”113 DNA collection is therefore distinguishable from the urine samples in Skinner, which were
removed through urinating, a bodily function that has long been regarded as a private and protected act.114 In the court’s reasoning, the
voluntary abandonment of DNA is so powerful it diminishes the individual privacy interest over DNA so greatly that this action alone
distinguishes DNA samples from the samples obtained in Skinner.115
One commentator has argued that this abandonment principle
can be expanded, and DNA removed from the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections entirely because of recent technological
advancements.116 DNA samples can now be obtained through the
application of a sticky patch to the skin, which peels off dead skin

108

Id.
Id. at *16.
110
Owens, 2006 WL 3725547, at *13.
111
Id. at *10.
112
Id. at *6 (noting that “DNA evidence is distinguishable as it is readily and involuntarily separated from the human body . . . [it] may be obtained . . . from various sources, including blood . . . semen . . . saliva, urine, hair, skin or . . . bones and teeth . . . [or] articles of
clothing, cigarette butts, chewing gum, envelopes, [and] stamps”).
113
Id.
114
Id. at *10 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617) (recognizing the degree of privacy traditionally afforded to the act of urination).
115
Owens, 2006 WL 3725547, at *13 (“The cases . . . overlook the critical fact that one’s
DNA is routinely held out to the public.”).
116
Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031.
109
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cells containing the DNA sequence.117 This practice eliminates any
physical intrusion protected by Cupp and would remove DNA entirely from the protections of Skinner.118 Without the protections afforded to a physical intrusion and any protections afforded to private genetic information, the seizure of DNA by sticky patch is arguably
similar to taking a copy of an exposed and partially abandoned characteristic, such as a person’s fingerprint.119
However, the abandonment theory overlooks a key distinction: when a human leaves DNA behind in his everyday life, it is not
the same as surrendering DNA for evidentiary purposes. This distinction garners support from a careful reading of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cupp. In Cupp, the defendant walked into the police station with evidence literally on his hands in the form of a blood
stain in plain view.120 However, the search in Cupp did not occur until after police seized and analyzed this evidence.121 The holding,
which delayed the moment that the search occurred until the scientific analysis was conducted, implies that an additional, protected expectation of privacy exists for evidence when its incriminating character is not visible to the naked eye.122 This shows that there is an
interest in keeping DNA from being scientifically analyzed, even
though there may not be an interest in keeping the DNA within the
body.123 This is a distinction most people undoubtedly understand,
117

Id.
Skinner, 489 U.S. 602. See Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031 (arguing that frequent
abandonment of DNA, and the attempt to seize identity only DNA eliminates DNA from the
protections of Skinner).
119
Skinner, 489 U.S. 602. Fingerprints have long been distinguished because they are
constantly exposed to the public, are placed on all surfaces the individual comes into contact
with, and reveal nothing but the identity of the individual. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 727 (1969). These characteristics imply that the seizure of fingerprints creates a minimal intrusion and may be conducted on lower standards of suspicion. Id.
120
Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292.
121
Id. at 295.
122
See LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 2.6 (arguing that Cupp supports a distinction on these
grounds, that even though evidence may be plainly exposed, as was the blood spot on the
defendant’s hand in Cupp, that the subsequent microscopic analysis, constituted a second
search, one that defendant had an increased expectation of privacy over, and that interfered
with his bodily security). While the average person may recognize their DNA is placed on a
stamp, they also understand that the DNA cannot be identified, or even seen, without sophisticated scientific technology, and they would have an expectation that analysis would not
occur, negating any decrease in their expectation of personal privacy over DNA. Id.
123
Compare id. (arguing DNA is protected from analysis by a valid privacy interest), with
Owens, 2006 WL at 3725547, at *6 (arguing the mere separation of DNA eliminates almost
all privacy interests) See also infra Part B (discussing how the analysis of DNA is signifi118
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particularly in today’s society where popular media makes it quite
clear that DNA searches are going to be analyzed as evidence for the
purposes of prosecuting crimes.124 The way in which humans interact
with and dispose of DNA, therefore, does not justify lowering the
protections provided to DNA. In actuality, it implies that precedent
requires DNA to be considered a search warranting the full protections of probable cause.

B.

Genetic Privacy and Identity: DNA Is Not a
Fingerprint Anymore

An analogy to fingerprints is commonly used by those arguing that DNA should be excluded from the Fourth Amendment’s full
protection.125 The analogy centers around the assumption that the
portions of DNA seized are only relevant for the purpose of establishing the identity of a perpetrator and do not expose any private medical facts.126 The analogy is also defended on the grounds that DNA
serves only an identity function, and that its analysis is equally reliable to the analysis of fingerprints.127 However, these arguments are
weakened when considered in light of advances in DNA technology
and an analysis of the current state of the forensic process.

cantly more difficult and error prone, than the analysis of fingerprints).
124
See, e.g., Nielsen Ratings Service: Top Programs of 2011, http://blog.nielsen.com/
nielsenwire/media_entertainment/nielsens-tops-of-2011-television/ (listing two crime shows,
which use DNA testing for evidentiary purposes among the top ten primetime television
programs, and five crime shows, which occasionally use DNA testing for evidentiary purposes, among the top ten recorded programs on television, for all of 2011.
125
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671 (“The collection and maintenance of DNA information,
while effected through relatively more intrusive procedures such as blood draws or buccal
cheek swabs, in our view plays the same role as fingerprinting.”); Owens, 2006 WL
3725547, at *13 (“DNA evidence may be obtained, [in a] somewhat analogous [way] to a
fingerprint”). Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031 (equating DNA with fingerprints).
126
Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031-33 (arguing that DNA’s only difference from fingerprints is the potential to reveal facts protected by Skinner, but rejecting this concern as meaningless in light of the seizure of identity only DNA).
127
See id. at 1032 (making the comparison between DNA and fingerprints while conceding that core loci or microscopic portions of the DNA must be separated for the identity
function of the two types of evidence to be equal). This concession demonstrates that complex scientific procedures are irrelevant to the comparison of DNA to fingerprints to proponents of the fingerprint approach.
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DNA and Fingerprints Are Not the Same

The analysis of DNA evidence provides opportunities for unconstitutional invasions of privacy that fingerprint analysis does
not.128 An examination of these opportunities shows that comparing
DNA to fingerprints is essentially a way around Skinner’s protections
over private medical data.129 Taking the fingerprints of a suspect
provides absolutely no possibility of intrusion into liberty interests
whatsoever; fingerprinting merely serves to identify a suspect or
place him at a certain location.130 Fingerprinting, therefore, deserves
the lesser protections it has been afforded because it presents a significantly lower possibility of intrusion on personal liberty.131
By comparison, while it is true that only identity DNA is ultimately analyzed when a seizure of DNA occurs,132 during the process the entire DNA molecule is exposed, and this includes private
medical facts protected by Skinner.133 Even if the facts of the case
are not disclosed, those conducting the tests could still learn a variety
of information about the defendant, such as particular genetic characteristics like predisposition to disease, or even that a person suffers
from a particular disease.134 Certain diseases that can now be identified include serious mental illnesses,135 and the Supreme Court has
held, in other contexts, that the right to keep mental illness private is
a vital function of the Constitution and that liberty is greatly impaired
merely because of the stigma associated with suffering from such a
128

See Maunel E. Nestle, Fingerprint Identification, 36 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 285,
at 2 (2012) (defining fingerprints as a serious of loops, swirls, and ridges, which are unique
of identifiers of identity, and nothing else).
129
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (“[C]hemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a
host of private medical facts.”). The invasion on the privacy associated with the act of urinating also weighed in on the Court’s decision to consider these practices searches. Id.
130
See, e.g., Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 (reasoning that very few liberty interests are invaded
by the seizure of fingerprints, and they can be seized on a mere reasonable suspicion).
131
No information, other than an individual’s fingerprint, is revealed when a fingerprint
sample is taken. Nestle, supra note 128, at 2.
132
See Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 670 (interpreting the New York State DNA database as permitting only the seizure of identity DNA from offenders). See also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995c(3)(a) (“A sample appropriate for DNA testing to determine identification characteristics.”).
133
DNA molecules are contained in the blood seized, and then the identity portions of the
gene sequence are isolated. National Institute of Justice, DNA Evidence: Basics of Analyzing, http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/analyzing.htm.
134
DNA Forensics, supra note 89.
135
Mitchell, Blood Tests Could Reveal Bipolar Disorder, MSNBC Health Blog,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23337532/ns/health-mental_health/t/blood-test-could-revealbipolar-disorder/#.UGsrCE1lFPc (last visited June 4, 2013).
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condition.136 This exposure forces an individual to rely only on a
technician’s discretion and the deterrent effect of possible statutory
penalties to ensure that his or her private medical data is not exposed.137 While genetic privacy concerns are somewhat assuaged by
the use of identity-only DNA, which would only reveal the identity of
the subject and no additional facts, these concerns are in no way
eliminated. The mere possibility that damaging private medical facts
can be revealed justifies an explicit requirement that DNA be brought
within the protections of Skinner and the Fourth Amendment to avoid
an invasion of one’s privacy.
2.

Identity-Only DNA: It Is Not Just for
Identity Anymore

Another assertion made by those analogizing DNA to fingerprints is that both serve no purpose other than identifying a specific
individual.138 Any similarity between DNA and fingerprints has recently been called into question, however, as a group of scientists in
Israel recently fabricated DNA that can match any person in the
world, using strands of identity-only DNA.139 According to scientists
at the National Institute for Standards and Technology, the engineered DNA and bodily fluids were remarkably accurate and similar
to real samples.140 The fake DNA, which can be made by any “biology undergraduate,” according to the study author, is made through
either the identity DNA kept in a state database or a tiny sample of
DNA obtained from a person through surreptitious means. 141 This
duplication, or, more appropriately, “forging” technology permanently separates DNA from fingerprints. Not only is fingerprint forgery

136

Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (finding that public revelation of
mental illness can significantly impair one’s constitutional liberty interests in being free from
social stigma).
137
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-f (penalizing the unauthorized disclosure or use of DNA records). Contra Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031 (characterizing this fear as a simple mistrust
of government authorities). The fear rises above mistrust, as various constitutional protections are involved.
138
See sources cited supra note 125 (compiling cases comparing the identity function of
both DNA and fingerprints).
139
See Pollack, supra note 89.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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incredibly difficult to perform,142 but the comparison between DNA
and fingerprints rests on the assumption that identity DNA is useless
for any nefarious purpose.143
Although forgeries are remote possibilities, the distinction between fingerprints and DNA grows even stronger when they are considered. To illustrate, if a fingerprint analysis and a DNA comparison were presented to the fact-finder, the DNA report would have a
higher persuasive value.144 This is because DNA is well regarded as
a highly accurate form of identification, and because of this it is highly persuasive to jurors,145 regardless of whether DNA actually deserves this reputation for reliability.146 Thus, the mere possibility of
an incredibly persuasive - albeit forged - piece of evidence being introduced at trial weakens the analogy to fingerprints due to the potential heightened impact it could have on the fact-finder.147 By extension, this increases the intrusion on both personal liberty and bodily
control created by a DNA seizure because this technology shows that
DNA is not simply a means of identifying individuals any longer.148
It is essential now, in the face of potential forgery, to ensure that any
DNA sample is collected through a court order and by medical professionals adhering to strict medical and evidentiary protocols, rather
than surreptitiously acquiring samples involuntarily left behind by a
defendant. Therefore, the argument that lower protections for DNA
are warranted due to its identity function is adverse to the interests of
justice for a defendant.
142
See B. Geller, et al., Fingerprint Forgery-A Survey, J. FORENSIC SCI. 46(3) 731-33
(2001) (discussing how few cases of fingerprint forgery exist).
143
See sources cited supra note 125 (compiling cases equating fingerprints and identity
DNA); Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031.
144
See DAVID H. KAYE, ET AL., REFERENCE MANUAL FOR SCI. EVID. 129, 2011 WL
7724255, 54 (3d ed.) (discussing the possibility that the dense nature of DNA expert testimony makes it seem more persuasive than it actually is).
145
One author suggests the success of DNA as a persuasive tool is due in part by television dramatization of DNA evidence, like CSI, and that jurors get confused by much of the
math and science involved in DNA evidence. See L. Meyers, The Problem with DNA, AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N MONITOR, Vol. 38 No. 6, at 52.
146
See infra Part IV(c).
147
Meyers, supra note 145.
148
Undoubtedly the ultimate intrusion on bodily control, and personal liberty, would be if
bodily fluids were used to frame an individual, as the Fourth Amendment in its plain language protects the right of “people to be secure in their persons.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Any possible type of bodily forensic evidence can be forged, including evidence such as saliva, that merely establishes someone was in a particular location, and even semen, which
could be used to implicate someone in a heinous sexual attack. Pollack, supra note 89.
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DNA is Far More Difficult to Examine,
Increasing the Possibility of Error

The analogy to fingerprints rests on a third leg, that the subsequent analysis of the seized bodily items, namely DNA and fingerprints, are inherently equally reliable.149 However, this assumption
has been called into doubt in light of recent events bringing the value
and reliability of DNA evidence into question, independent of any
technological issues. While the science of DNA is not open to question, the fallibility of the technicians processing the associated samples should be.150 DNA samples can be contaminated quite easily by
a variety of sources.151 These sources include chemical agents that
are simply nearby when the sample is collected, or even trace DNA
from the technician processing the sample.152 If a DNA sample is
degraded in any way, the ensuing analysis can be fraught with inaccuracy.153
In addition, DNA technicians have also revealed that they
have withheld or manipulated evidence for unknown reasons.154
Technicians have even alluded to the fact that the labs themselves are
filled with error, but do the best they can.155 This issue is particularly
relevant in light of the recent issues at the Nassau County Evidence
Lab, where errors forced the lab to retest over 3,000 scientific samples because of possible error, and 9,000 convictions were called into
doubt.156 Errors like these indicate that even if the science is acceptable, the scientists performing the tests may still be acting in a
way that makes the procedure unsafe and unreliable.
In addition, simple clerical errors, such as misplacing or
switching samples have been known to lead to wrongful convictions,
149

See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(5) (assigning value to identity only DNA).
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (highlighting a variety of the
issues that affect the forensic sciences, including fraudulent, and incompetent analysts).
151
Laurel Beeler, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH L. REV. 903, 921
(1988) (detailing the possibility of bacteria infiltrating and affecting a DNA sample).
152
Id.
153
Polanco, supra note 11, at 526 (showing some of the errors presented in police conduct
in handling a DNA sample).
154
John Solomon, Conviction Tossed on FBI Lab Misconduct, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May
27, 2003.
155
Id.
156
Frank Eltman, Nassau County Shuts Down Crime Lab, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011.
150
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an issue that arises not from the science of DNA but from the human
nature of the technicians testing it.157 Comparing these issues to fingerprints, DNA testing relies heavily on these questionable and complicated procedures, whereas the analysis of fingerprints does not.158
The greater degree of difficulty associated with examining DNA further weakens the analogy to fingerprints and increases the degree of
intrusion created by a DNA search.
V.

CONCLUSION

Should the threshold determination be made that the search
was supported by probable cause; the Kings County Criminal Court
will require the defendant, Vernon B., to submit a DNA sample.159
This DNA seizure and any subsequent uses of that DNA evidence,
have a significant impact on his “bodily integrity.” However, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment presents a
safeguard for his bodily interests, and has implemented procedures to
protect against any mischief that may result from the use of this evidence and any ensuing impairments on liberty.160 That protection is
probable cause, a standard that channels the inquiry towards the
strength of the evidence and helps establish whether conducting a
search is reasonable, despite the intrusions that are created.161 This
safeguard of probable cause is required in the context of DNA because of the high likelihood of unreasonable intrusions, and the everchanging nature and degree of these possible intrusions in relation to
our understanding of DNA science.162
Despite this important safeguard, some argue that because
DNA is involuntarily abandoned in our everyday lives, it therefore
157

Ryan McDonald, Juries and Crime Labs: Correcting the Weak Links in the DNA
Chain, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 356 (illustrating the difficulties crime labs face in maintaining DNA samples).
158
Simply by their relevant natures this fact is inferred, comparison fingerprinting merely
requires an analysis of the similarities between two enlarged photographs. Geller, supra
note 142, at 731. Whereas, DNA requires microscopic analysis and the isolation of incredibly complex and individual parts of the human cell structure. DNA Forensics, supra note
89.
159
35 Misc. 3d 1241(a).
160
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 652, 678-79 (Lynch, J., concurring).
161
Id. at 680.
162
The Kings County Criminal Court revisited the issue of whether the police acted lawfully when seizing the gun from Vernon B.’s home, and determined that they had. Vernon
B., 954 N.Y.S. 2d 835, 835 (Crim. Ct. 2012). On November 19, 2012 the court granted the
People’s motion for a DNA order. Id. at 836.
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does not warrant any type of protection.163 A careful reading of precedent shows, however, that regardless of this involuntariness an individual does not abandon the right to protect that DNA from analysis,
nor does he surrender the privacy associated with medical facts discernible from that sample.164 Others analogize DNA to a fingerprint
to further the argument against protection, arguing that DNA serves
no purpose other than to identify an individual.165 However, the associated science clearly shows DNA consists of something more; it is
the blueprint to life containing almost every private medical fact
about us, going far beyond mere identifying characteristics unlike a
simple picture of the outside of a finger.166 Other distinctions between DNA and fingerprints, such as the inherent possibility of nefarious use and the differing levels of complexity required for analysis,
create an insurmountable divide. This divide, which is founded on
legal precedent, scientific principles, recent scientific developments,
and common sense distinctions between types of forensic evidence,
all outlined above, truly demonstrates why DNA must be protected in
full by the Fourth Amendment and never be subject to any lesser
standard.
Avi Goldstein*

163
Owens, 2006 WL 3725547, at *6 (reasoning that because DNA can be voluntarily separated, for example through expectorating, it is more akin to a characteristic constantly exposed to the public, and there is little Fourth Amendment protection for these characteristics,
as is there is a diminished expectation of privacy over what one knowingly exposes to the
public).
164
See generally Cupp, 412 U.S. 291; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; and infra sections III(b) and
III(c).
165
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671 (majority opinion) (“The collection and maintenance of
DNA information, while effected through relatively more intrusive procedures such as blood
draws or buccal cheek swabs, in our view plays the same role as fingerprinting.”); Owens,
2006 WL 3725547, at *13 (“DNA evidence may be obtained, [in a] somewhat analogous
[way] to a fingerprint”). Alfano, supra note 104, at 1031 (equating DNA with fingerprints).
166
See DNA Forensics, supra note 89 (discussing how a genetic blueprint, like DNA, can
only provide limited additional information to identity at this time, but the science is expanding, and some of the material available now, is something which individuals could expect to
keep private, such as susceptibility to disease).
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